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IN THE SHADOW OF MOUNT RAMELAU:

SOME SKETCHES OF EAST TIMORESE CULTURES[1]

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THE objective of this paper is to share some knowledge[3] that I have gained about East Timorese cultures. And since I am myself not an expert, but only a novice in this field, this paper can only present some "sketches" of the incredible wealth of East Timorese cultures.

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THERE seems to be two misconceptions I have often discovered in the way East Timorese cultures have been presented by other authors. Two radically opposite misconceptions color the literature about East Timor. From the authors who symphatize with the independence struggle of the Maubere people, there is a strong tendency to underline the uniqueness of the East Timorese cultures, which is claimed to be completely different from the Indonesian cultures, from which they take the Javanese culture to be the most representative symbol. E.g., in his defence plea before the Indonesian court in Dili, the most prominent leader of the Maubere resistance, Jose Alexandre Gusmao a.k.a. Kay Rala Xanana, stated that only during the stone ages were there same similarities between the cultures of the East Timorese people with some of the peoples of East Nusa Teng-gara (NTT = Nusa Tenggara Timur) province of Indonesia.

On the other hand, among pro-integration anthropologists and other social scientists who have studied East Timorese cultures, I have noticed some underestimation of the cultural resilience or the adaptativeness of the East Timorese cultures towards the various waves of domination with which they have had to cope. This underestimation is focused, a.o. at the role of Tetun (= Tetum), the *lingua franca* of East Timor, and the role of the Catholic Church in this stillborn nation. This underestima-

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3) I have maintained a strong interest in the lot of the East Timorese people, since the aborted decolonisation process in 1975. I first visited East Timor as a journalist with the Indonesian weekly magazine, *Tempo*, in 1974, during the Portuguese administration. My most recent visit to East Timor was in July 1993, during the late Indonesian administration. I have also interviewed East Timorese from the various political factions in Indonesia, in the U.S.A. (during my graduate studies at Cornell Univeristy in 1981-1982, 1987-1989, and 1991-1992), and in Portugal (during the latest East Timor symposium organized by the Oporto University in Estoril in late July 1993), and consulted the literature on East Timor in Indonesian, English, Dutch, and Portuguese, to inform myself about the topic of this paper.

tion of the vitality of East Timorese cultures has been combined with a historical portrayal that in the former times, the entire island was united by one powerful kingdom, namely the kingdom of Belu, which its seat in West Timor, from where it spread the Tetun language all over the island (see for instance, Lapian and Abdurachman, 1980: 12-14; and Neonbasu, 1992: 20).

Budhisantoso, for instance, one of Indonesia's most prominent anthropologists, claims that Tetun is not an effective vehicle for spreading the Christian religion in East Timor (1980: 7, footnote No. 8). That is certainly a groundless claim, because during the Portuguese era, Tetun had not been used as the major language for Catholic religious purposes, although a Tetun catechism had already been produced by the church and the main prayers could already been recited by some of the Catholics in the rural interior in Tetun. After the Indonesian occupation, however, when Portuguese was forbidden and when the East Timorese Catholic church was not keen to adopt the Indonesian language as the major liturgical language, Tetun was adopted instead.[4] And currently, one can certainly observe the results of that policy: the members of the Catholic church in East Timor has grown drastically from only 27.8% of the population in 1973 to 81.4% in 1989 (Neonbasu, 1992: 76).[5]

Both the misconception that the East Timorese cultures are completely distinct from Indonesian cultures as well as the misconception that the East Timorese cultures are just subcultures of Indonesia-based cultures seem to be ignorant of various lessons which history may teach us. Not all German-speaking peoples are happily united in one nation. Instead, they are spread over various nation-states, namely Germany, Austria, and Swiss. Similarly, not all the Malay-speaking peoples live in Malaysia. Instead, they are spread over Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Singapore, as well as Thailand. And if we expand the Malay-speaking peoples with all the peoples in the world who speak several of the Malay-Polynesian -- or Austronesian -- languages, this

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4) Prior to the decision of the Diocese of Dili to adopt Tetun as their major liturgical language, a similar step had already been taken by the radical pro-independence party, Fretilin, in their party platform as well as in their actual program, namely their Paulo Freire-style literacy program among the hilltribes.

5) Other factors apart from the adoption of Tetun that have boosted the drastic increase of Catholics in East Timor, are (a) the religious policy of the Indonesian state which forces every citizen to adopt one of the five officially recognized religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hindu and Buddhism), wherein Catholicism seemed to be the most atractive choice, since the other recognized religions were mostly the religions of the newcomers and non-East Timorese; (b) the progressive stance which had been taken by the Catholic church in East Timor, especially under the leadership of Monsenhores Martinho Lopes and Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, to defend the universal human rights of the East Timorese people, including their right for self-determination; (c) particip-ation in the numerous religious activities of the Catholic church was the only way to associate freely and in large numbers, which the Indonesian authorities could not easily forbid, due to their Pancasila principles; (d) the iconography of the Catholic church, such as the crucifixes, Madonna statues, and *via dolorosa* structures, substituted many of the indigenous forms of ancestor worship in the territory which were not so easy to carry out; and (e) the influx of Catholics from the dominantly Catholic regions of East Nusa Tenggara province, especially the Tetun - speaking people from the district of Belu in West Timor, who could easily travel by land to East Timor.

cultural realm will cover even many more independent as well as stillborn nation-states.

Therefore, why should we omit the fact that there various strong cultural similarities between the East and the West Timorese, some of whom speak the same Tetun language, originate from the same Belu or Tetun ethnolinguistic group and profess in the same Catholic faith? I certainly do not see that as a condition that they should be merged into one nation-state, if the peoples of those two parts of the Timor island do not wish so.

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HAVING deconstructed the fallacy of overly stressing the "distinctiveness" of East Timorese cultures as well as overly stressing the "similarness" of East Timorese cultures with other Indonesian cultures seems to leave us with no room to comprehend the East Timorese cultures in a more positive way. Yet, I do believe that there are certain keys to analyze the East Timorese cultures, and relate them with the strugggle that is still going on in the territory. Two of those "keys" are the ecological and the historical settings of East Timor. The ecological setting influenced and still influences the *synchronic* changes, while the historical setting influenced and still incluences the *diachronic* changes of the East Timorese cultures.

According to the Portuguese architect, Ruy Cinatti, East Timor -- including the enclave of Oecussi -- can be distinguished in three major ecosystems or biomes, namely: first, the mountains; second, the hills and plateaux; and third, the plains (Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 56-57). Obviously, those three different biomes are not evenly distributed all over the island. The western and central part of East Timor is much more mountaineous than the eastern part, which is covered more by hills, plateaux, and plains. Plains also cover more of the southern than the northern coast of the territory, which is covered more by tidal swamps abundant with mangrove forests. This ecological division has influenced the population distribution of the island, which in turn effected the concentration of the indigenous population (see Map # 1), and consequently, Portuguese colonization and land-use patterns.

The western and central part of the territory, where the Ramelau mountain range was located and had the highest population density in the territory (up to 40 persons/ Km2 in 1950), became an ideal place to introduce coffee. And with coffee, came the two major large plantation systems into East Timor. First, large plantations which were controlled directly by state-owned companies, such as the 9,000 hectares coffee plantation in Fatubessi, Ermera, which was owned directly by SAPT (Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho) -- which have now been taken over by an Indonesian company, PT Salazar Coffee Plantations.

The second large plantation system are the *fazendas*,[6] which were owned by individual families, through whom the Portuguese colonial administration ruled East Timor. Those families consisted of families of the *liurai*,[7] or chieftains, who were supportive of the colonial power, and families of the Portuguese radicals who were deported to East Timor. By awarding them those land favors, the Portuguese colonial administration "bribed" those *deportados* into supporting Portuguese rule in the territory. The *mesticos* who were the offsprings of those *deportados* became the second layer in the Portuguese colonial administration, together with the families of the faithful *liurais* [8] and officials from the African territories[9] who were posted in East Timor (Aditjondro, 1993a: 9-10).[10] They also enjoyed more educational opportunities in the territory, in other Portuguese colonies, such as Macao, as well as in Portugal or other European countries.[11]

The eastern part of the territory, with its abundant hills, plateaux, and plains, and a much lower population density (up to 10 persons / Km2 in 1950, with the exception of Baucau, which already had up to 40 persons / Km2), became less attractive for the Portuguese rulers. With the exception of Viqueque, the population of the eastern part of the territory had also not been under the influence of the Tetun-speaking Belu kingdom (which contradicts the myth that the Belu kingdom ever united the whole island of Timor), and were also more rebelious to the Portuguese rulers and their Catholic faith. The people of Tutuala, for instance, the eastern-most settlement in East Timor, were christianized by the Salesian missionaries as recent as January 31, 1948 (Vasconcelos, 1992). In contrast, the first baptism of the Bunaq people -- whose homeland covers the western part of East Timor and West Timor -- already took place more than a century earlier, on July 19, 1875 (Bele, 1992: 36).

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6) A *fazenda* consists of a combination of a large single-crop plantation, small family farms of the plantation workers, and the large houselot of the *fazenda* owner. The relation between the *fazenda* owner and his plantation workers is not purely a business-like employer-employee relationsip, but more of a 'patron-client' relationship. The Carrascalao family, for instance, owned a *fazenda* of about 500 Ha in the border area between Liquica and Ermera. Mario Viegas Carrascalao, the oldest son of the Portuguese *deportado*, later became the third governor of East Timor after the Indonesian occupation.

7) The *liurai* of Atsabe, Guilherme Maria Goncalves, who later became the second governor of East Timor after the Indonesian occupation, is a large *fazenda* owner in Ermera.

8) A *liurai*, which is the Tetun word for king, is the head of several *sucos*, or smaller tribes, which include several *lorus*, or clans.

9) When I first visited East Timor in April 1974, I met a Mozambiquean *administrador*, or head of a *concelho* (district) in Liquica.

10) It is interesting to note that some of the outstanding leaders of the "Anti-Communist Revolutionary Movement" (MRAC = *Movimento Revolucionario de Anti-Communista*), the coalition of four parties which "invited" Indonesia's invasion to kick out the "Communist" Fretilin from Dili, came from the families of *deportados* and *liurais* who had been very supportive of Portuguese rule before and were large *fazenda* owners. I am talking here mainly of the Carrascalao and Goncalves families.

11) Mario Carrascalao, for instance, received his agricultural degree in Portugal. While Jose Goncalves, the oldest son of Guilherme Goncalves, received his economics degree in Belgium.

This "east-west" differences among the Maubere people has developed into a popular names -- and stereotypes that goes with those names -- for the two groups, namely "Firaco" for the Easterners and "Caladi"[12] for the Westerners. The Caladis were stereotyped as being more "civilized" and hence more diplomatical than the Firacos, who were considered to be more "barbarian" and prefer to fight than to negotiate.

This stereotype still lasts until today, informed by the fact that the former leaders of the independence movement who were Caladis -- such as Francisco Xavier do Amaral -- were too eager to surrender and negotiate with the Indonesian forces, while Firacos such as Kay Rala Xanana -- have shown a much stronger fighting spirit. And even among the pro-integration leaders, such as the present governor, Jose Abilio Osorio-Soares, who can be categorized as a Firaco since he hails from Manatuto, which is also Xanana's home district, also showed a tough fighting spirit in insisting that all future district heads (*bupati*) in East Timor should be native, civilian East Timorese. For months has he consistently resisted the wish of the Udayana army regional commander, Brig. Gen.Theo Syafei, to put military men from outside East Timor in some of the strategic *bupati* posts in the territory, such as Viqueque.[13]

As with any stereotype, the "Firaco-Caladi" characterization of the East Timorese, however, is also full of exceptions. Guilherme Goncalves, a Caladi who hails from Ermera, also showed a rebellios spirit who was not always eager to negotiate, when as the second pro-Indonesian governor of East Timor, he openly criticized the coffee monopoly which was supported by the Indonesian army officers. He had also publicly criticized those officers in the 1980/1981 Old & New Year's party in the governor's residence for the atrocities which had been carried out against the Timorese people in the previous year. Consequently, in 1981 he was kicked out from the official governor's residence after only two year in power, and in the following year his tenure was reduced from five to four years, under the pretext that he spoke such bad Indonesian. After withdrawing from East Timor as well as from politics to business, even his microbus company which he managed in Jakarta has been hindered by the Jakarta special territory government (*Fakta*, 1 June 1993: 78-79).[14]

On the other hand, Firaco fighters such as Kay Rala Xanana has also shown sophisticated diplomatic skills, when in 1988 he managed to reorganize the scattered resistence units into an umbrella organization, CNRM,[15] after dropping the more leftist

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12) The term "Caladi" probably comes from the Portuguese word, *calado/a*, an adjective which means silent or quiet.

13) See the debate which has been continuously reported by two Indonesian dailies, *Jawa Pos* and *Nasa*, from September till December 1993.

14) This shows how little respect the Indonesian authorities have for one of the signatories of the so-called "Balibo declaration," which was actually signed in a hotel in Bali.

15) *Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Mau-bere* = National Consultation of the Maubere Resistance.



de 0 a 10 h/q.q.

de 10 a 30 h/q.q.

de 30 a 40 h/q.q.

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Map # 1
Population distribution in East Timor in 1950
(Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 28)

stance of Fretilin and appealing for a multi-party system. The more conservative pro-independence party, UDT,[16] was included in the CNRM coalition, together with FALINTIL, the former Fretilin army which had been transformed into a national army, after Xanana had returned his own Fretilin member card.

After making all those organizational changes, based on the resolutions of the first and second national conferences of Fretilin in the interior in 1981 and 1984, and endorsed by the formation of the UDT-Fretilin National Convergence in Portugal in 1986, Xanana showed further negotiation skills in dealing with "outsiders." First he negotiated with the acting Bishop of Dili, Mgr. Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo,[17] to obtain the support of the church for the independence struggle, and even negotiated for a cease fire with the Indonesian army commander of East Timor, Col. Purwanto. Unfortunately, that cease fire was pretty soon annulled by the then Indonesian chief of the armed forces, General Benny Murdani. Mgr. Belo himself, who hails from Baucau, is another Firaco who has shown very sophisticated diplomatic skills and has continuously maintained a relatively independent stance for his diocese, though confronting Indonesian government and church authorities who continuously urged him to publicly declare his support for integration.

Anyhow, this Firaco-Caladi characterization of the resistance's leadership is only a partial explanation for the resilience of the guerilla war in the eastern tip, or *ponta leste*. Other factors, such as the terrain with its savannahs and hills, culminating in the Matebian mountain from where "mouse trails" allow the *guerrilheros* to slip into the three bordering districts -- Lautem, Baucau, and Viqueque --, plus the tacit support of *colegios*[18] which silently took care of the wives, widows, children and orphans of the *guerilheros* were also decisive in prolonging the independence war.

This brings us back to the ecological setting of East Timor. The ecological diversity of the territory, which has been discussed earlier, has developed seven major styles of vernacular architecture, namely (1) the Bobonaro style; (2) the Maubisse style; (3) the Baucau style; (4) the Lautem style; (5) the Viqueque style; (6) the Suai style; and (7) the Oecussi style (see Map # 2 and Table 1).Those architectural styles are, I believe,

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16) *União Democrática Timorense* = Democratic Union of Timor. This party, which was the first to be established in territory, after the Carnation Revolution, brought together most of the bureacrats and large landowners, whom initially favored a long-term association with Portugal which would gradually lead towards full-independence. After their aborted coup on August 11, 1975, when they were kicked out from Dili by the pro-Fretilin armed forces, they joined hands with the pro-integration party, Apodeti, and two Apodeti off-springs, Kota and Trabalhista, to form an "anti-Communist" coalition which invited Indonesia's intervention.

17) After the withdrawal of the Diocese of Dili from the Portuguese conference of bishops, the Pope has directly taken over the role as Bishop of Dili, while Mgr. Belo is merely administrating the diocese on behalf of the Pope.

18) A *colegio* is a Catholic center which consists of a parish-church, a convent for the priests, brothers, or nuns, a boarding school for boys or girls, and a large tract of farm land which is rented to local farmers as well as farmed by the students themselves, to support that educational institute.



Map # 2
Distribution of the seven major architectural styles in East Timor
(Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 56)

Table 1:
The seven major architectural styles in East Timor
(Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 57)

SINAIS	REGIÃO	PLANTAS E ALÇADOS	ALTITUDE
	BÓBONARO		MONTANHA
	MAUBISSE		MONTANHA
	BAUCAU		COLINAS PLANALTO
	LAUTEM		COLINAS PLANALTO
	VIQUEQUE		PLANÍCIE
	SUAI		PLANÍCIE
	OCUSSI		PLANÍCIE

much more varied than in most of the Eastern Indonesian provinces. As I have mentioned elsewhere, the Lautem, or more known as the "Lospalos style" reminds one of the *tongkonan*, the tall and beautifully decorated houses of the Toraja in the highlands of South Sulawesi. While the Bobonaro and Maubisse styles remind one of the *sillimo* and other Central Range architectures in the New Guinean highlands (Aditjondro, 1993a: 16; Aditjondro, 1989: 12). On the other hand, the Viqueque, Suai, and Oecussiarchitectural styles of the East Timorese plains remind one of the houses of the Atoni in West Timor and other plains peoples in Eastern Indonesia. So, in other words, the architectural diversity of East Timor can be seen as a "micro-cosmos" of nearly the entire eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago, with glimpses of the Melanesian and Polynesian archipelagoes as well.

Speaking about the similarities of certain East Timorese architectural styles with those from other parts of the Indonesian archipelago as well as the Melanesian and Polynesian archipelagoes, touches upon the unique historical setting of East Timor. Because other factors -- besides the ecological ones -- have to be influential in shaping all those different architectural styles. Among those "other factors", the historical ones seem to be the most influential.

What I mean by those "historical factors" is the unique geographical setting of East Timor, which locates it at the crossroads of all the major Asia-Pacific migrations during the pre-historical times as well as at the crossroads of all the major Western superpowers during the modern times. As observed by Mendes Correia, the pre-historical migrations have imprinted the genes of four races among the indigenous population of East Timor, which are (1) the Melanesoid race; (2) the Vedo-Australoid race; (3) the Proto-Malay race; and (4) the youngest race in this region, namely the Deutero-Malay race (Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 26).

Before the Indonesian invasion, the distribution of those racial genes were as follows: 7.5% Melanesoids; 13% Vedo-Australoids; 19.3% Deutero-Malays; and 60% Proto-Malays (see Map # 3). This explains why one can see such a high diversity of postures among the East Timorese peoples, ranging from the shorter, darker skinned and more Papuan looking highlanders from the western interior, to the more taller, fairer skinned and Polynesian looking lowlanders from the eastern part of the territory. This also explains the similarity between the Lospalos architectural style with the Torajanese as well as Batak architectural styles, since the people who built those beautifully decorated houses in Lospalos were predominantly of the Proto-Malay stock, just like their Torajanese and Batak brothers and sisters.

Some of the migration routes of the East Timorese ancestors have been documented in the popular legends of the East Timorese, which traces their origin to Malacca, Makassar (now, Ujungpandang) in South Sulawesi, as well as the island of Ceram in the Moluccas (see Map # 4). One of the most popular myth is about the origin of the island from a crocodile, who was actually a wanderer from Macassar, South Sulawesi. This myth, which has inspired many decorative patterns in East Timor (see



Map # 3
Racial distribution of the East Timorese population,
prior to the Indonesian occupation
(Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 26)



Map # 4
The legendary migration of the ancestors of the East Timorese
(Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 14)



Sketch # 1
Symbolic motives of crocodiles on the panel of a house
(Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 13)

Sketch # 1), is shared by the East Timorese with the Atoni of West Timor (Cinatti, 1987: 154-155; Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 13).

Later on, due to the inclusion of East Timor in the Portuguese imperium, where its status was raised during the last stage of Portuguese colonialism into an "overseas province" with the same status as the African colonies, among which a rotation of civil servants and military personnel was applied, with East Timorese serving in Africa and Africans serving in East Timor, African blood began to circulate among the East Timorese people. Prior to that, European blood had began to circulate in the East Timorese veins, due to the voluntary as well as compulsory settlement of Portuguese in the territory. In the mean time, Arab migrants from what is currently the United Yemen Republic as well as Chinese migrants had also settled down in the territory, attracted by the lucrative sandalwood trade in the past.

The Portuguese language, however, was only spoken among the assimilated elites in the townships of Dili and Baucau. Apart from Portuguese and other foreign languages -- such as Chinese and Arabic -- the majority of the indigenous East Timorese people still spoke their vernacular languages about a decade ago. Besides leaving its physical imprints in the genes of the population, the various waves of migration also interacted with the geographical isolation of the various ecosystems in East Timor to create more than thirty vernacular languages, some of which can still be divided into several dialects (see Map # 5 and Table 2).

As we can seen from the map and the list, the nine largest vernacular languages, in terms of numbers of speakers, are Tetun, Mambai, Makasai, Kemak (= Ema), Bunak, Tokodede, Galoli, Dagada (Fataluku), and Vaiqueno. Combined with all the smaller vernaculars, East Timor can be characterized by a much greater linguistic diversity than West Timor (see Map # 6), where the main languages are Atoni (similar to Vaiqueno), Belu (similar to Tetun), Marae and Kemak (similar to the Bunak and Kemak languages in Bobonaro, East Timor), Helon (only on the island of Semau), and Rote (the language of Rote migrants on West Timor) (see Suparlan, 1971: 204). So, out of those six major West Timorese languages,[19] four overlap with the thirty languages of the East Timorese.

East Timor's greater linguistic diversity can also be found in smaller parts of the territory, for instance on the island of Atauro, north of the Dili Bay, which has been treated as a "prison island" by the Portuguese as well as Indonesian rulers, shows a quite high linguistic diversity. The indigenous inhabitants of that island, who amounted only to 5,180 people in 1915, speak three different languages. The Makili and Makdadi peoples who inhabit the southern part of the island speak the Ressuk and Raklang'u languages, while the Beloi and Bikeli peoples speak the Rahessuk languages. It is still unclear whether those three languages should be treated as independent languages, or as creoles, since most of their vocabulary were derived from -- or

19) One has to take into consideration, though, that the Rotinese pride themselves of speaking 18 different "languages," originating from the 18 small kingdoms in their island (see Fox, 1977:80-81).



Map # 5
Linguistic map of Timor
(Source: Fundacao Oriente, 1989: 167)

Table 2:
List of East Timorese vernacular languages

Name of language	Total number of speakers, prior to 1975	Classified as Austronesian or Non-Austronesian language	Name of dialects
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Tetun	220,000	Austronesian	Tetun Dili or Tetun Praca; Tetun Balibo; Tetun Suai; Tetun Viqueque
Mambae	80,000	Austronesian	Mambae Ermera; Mambae Letefoho; Mambae Maubisse; Mambae Hatu Builico
Makasai	60,000	Non-Austronesian	
Ema (Kemak)	59,000	Non-Austronesian	
Bunaq (= Marai)	50,000	Non-Austronesian	
Tukudede	45,000	Austronesian	
Galole	30,000	Austronesian	
Dagada (= Fataluku)	30,000	Non-Austronesian	
Baiqueno (= Atoni)	14,000	Austronesian	
Idate	?	Non-Austronesian	
Isui	?	?	
Lacalei	?	?	

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(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lolei	?	?	
Lovaia	?	?	Epulo, Macae, Lovaia
Habo	?	?	
Cairui	?	Austronesian	
Midiki	?	Non-Austronesian	
Naueti	?	Non-Austronesian	
Nai-damo	?	?	
Na Ine	?	?	
Na Nahec	?	?	
Osso-Moco	?	?	
Maku'a	?	?	
Maklere (=Maculere)	?	?	
Sahani	?	?	
Socolori	?	?	
Uai-Moa (= Waima'a)	?	?	
Ressuk (= Uho-Manguili?)	?	Austronesian	
Raklung'u	?	Austronesian	
Rahessuk	?	Austronesian	

Sources: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987: 27; Vasconcelos, 1992; Fundacao Oriente, 1989: 167; Duarte, 1984: 11-20; Masinambouw, 1980: 70-74; Suparlan, 1971: 203-204.



Map # 6
Linguistic map of West Timor
(Source: Suparlan, 1971: 204)

similar to -- Malay, Tetum, Mambai, Galole and Cairui words (Duarte, 1984: 1511, 15, 19-20; Vasconcelos, 1992). Another area in East Timor with a high linguistic diversity is Laga, in Baucau district, where the people speak Nai-damo, Na Ine, Sahani, and Waima'a (Vasconcelos, 1992; Funcacao Oriente, 1989: 167).

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THESE sketches of East Timorese cultures would be incomplete if one does not conclude it with some brief sketches about the cultural impact of the present Indonesian occupation. Let us first begin by investigating which group has had to pay the highest death toll. As we can see from Table 3, it were the unassimilated peoples -- the so-called *gentios*, or "pagans" -- whose population had been reduced drastically (Dirdja, 1979: 22-23, quoted in Aditjondro, 1993b: 39). Or at least, considering the difficulties of carrying out a proper census in the midst of a war zone, it is safe to say that the unassimilated East Timorese, who were mostly living in the valleys of the Ramelau mountain range in the interior of the western part of the territory, whose livelihood had been most drastically effected.

Table 3:
Estimated population decline in East Timor from 1974 till 1978

Population Group based on Religion	Total Population	
	1974	1978
Catholics	220,314	225,417
Protestants	2,550	4,354
Confucians	5,660	no data available
Moslems	135	661
Gentios (Pagans)	460,112	68,839
	668,771	329,271

Source: Dirdja, 1979: 22-23.

Apart from the statistical problems in determining the exact number of casualties, various other ways of executing the survivors of the aerial bombing were developed in the western part of the territory. One of them was plunging those suspected of supporting the freedom movement over the cliffs of the Sarei river at Builico in the district of Ainaro.[20] Other ways were by plunging the suspects into the sea of the Dili

[20]) Catholic church sources have estimated that between 200 to 400 people were executed at Builico between 1981 and 1983, hence the place earned the title of "the second Jakarta" (*Jakarta Kedua*), since many Fretilin suspects had also been "invited" for "trips to Jakarta" by helicopters, which actually plunged them into the sea. To commemorate those victims, the local parish has erected --

Bay, or by overcrowding prisoners in barracks on the Atauro island with 40 to 80 inmates, covered with black canvas.[21]

That high death toll was not only paid by the non-Christianized highlanders in the western part of the island, but also by thousands of the indigenous peoples in the eastern point (*ponta leste*), who fled with the guerillas to the Matebian mountain. Faithful to its name, "the abode of the death," Matebian became the silent witness when Indonesian counter-insurgence airplanes raided the mountain slopes with its fatal bombs, forcing the surviving guerilla fighters and villagers down to the lowlands of Baucau, into the resettlement camps in Laga. After the aerial bombing of Matebian, many more of the survivors died in the camps, if they were not executed by plunging them from the notorious Celicai river banks, the "second hell" (*segundo inferno*), as the local people came to call that place.

Now that the "open war" has ended (and turned into a long-lasting guerilla war), many highlanders and other villagers who had to live in the settlement camps in the lowlands have been allowed to return to their villages on the mountains, hills, and plains. Back home, however, life has not returned to normal. Coffee, the main cash crop of the highlanders, has been monopolized by an Army-backed company, PT Denok Hernandes Indonesia, since the beginning of the occupation, which has drastically reduced the income of the coffee farmers (see Lolly, 1993: 57), with the exception of the old and new *fazenda* owners. Another Army-backed company, PT Scent Indonesia, has monopolized the production of sandalwood oil. Both companies as well as PT Salazar Coffee Plantations, which has taken over the SAPT plantations in Liquica and Ermera, belong to a holding company, PT Batara Indra Group (see Table 4).

As we can see from Table 4, the production of four major commodities -- coffee, sandalwood, marble, and sugar --, have practically or nearly been monopolized by this conglomerate. So is the trend in the production of handicrafts from marble and the sandalwood wasted from the sandalwood oil production. And according to one of my sources, some of the marble ashtrays sold on the roadside in Manatuto were made by East Javanese migrants. This will, or can severly limit the areas for the small farmers and craftspersons. Sandalwood and marble are actually strategic commodities for the indigenous rural people, because it does not need sophisticated technology to carve miniature Lospalos houses or rosaries from sandalwood, or ash trays from marble. Unfortunately, there are indications that the supply of sandalwood might have

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since many Fretilin suspects had also been "invited" for "trips to Jakarta" by helicopters, which actually plunged them into the sea. To commemorate those victims, the local parish has erected -- ironically, with the support of the local military unit -- a large cross at Builico, where Timorese people passing by used to stop to pray briefly near the cross.

21) The Jakarta weekly magazine, *Tempo*, has estimated that about 5,000 persons had been enjailed on Atauro in 1982/1983, which was nearly as much as the number of Atauro's indigenous inhabitants (27 August 1988: 22). Meanwhile, according to other sources, 387 inmates had died in 2 1/2 years on Atauro, due to the bad prison condition. After protests from the ICRC, the surviving inmates were removed and resettled in several "prison villages" on the mainland of East Timor.

been drastically reduced (see Tables 5 and 6). Meanwhile, Batara Indra personnel who were in charge of the sandalwood and marble businesses could not tell me whether

Table 4:
List of PT Batara Indra Group (BIG)'s member companies

No.	Name of company	Line of business & other information
(I)	(II)	(III)
01.	PT Denok Hernandes Indonesia	coffee trade; oldest BIG member, since this company arrived with the Indonesian troops in 1975.
02.	PT Salazar Coffee Plantations	took over SAPT coffee plantations in Ermera.
03.	PT Pelayaran Neediak	sea-freight company.
04.	PT Batara Indra	initially established to manage the tourist and recreation activities of this group, it turned into BIG's holding company, which also imported various kinds of consumer goods to East Timor, from Indonesian cooking oil, sugar, wheat, and cement to Portuguese wines. The shipment of its merchandise to/from East Timor was handled mainly by PT Neediak.
05.	Toko Marina	Dili's major department store, located in Colmera.
06.	PT Scent Indonesia	produces sandalwood oil, a basic material for perfumes, in it's factory in Dili. It exports this commodity by air from Jakarta for US$ 150 per kg in 50 kg drums. This factory, the only one in East Timor, has invested Rp. 1,395,671,000 (the largest industrial investment in East Timor so far), employs 42 workers, produces 465 tons of sandalwood oil and waste sold for Rp. 497,088,000 (1990).
07.	PT Marmer Alam Timor Timur	produces marble in Manatuto. In 1993, it was officially still a "project" and not yet declared to be a commercial operation since the marble produced was not yet profitable (its quality was considered to be lower than Tulungagung marble in East Java, and the transportation cost to Java was obviously much higher compared to marble from Java and Lampung, Southern Sumatra).

		So far, the East Timorese marble produced by this

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(I)	(II)	(III)
		company has been exported to two sister companies of BIG in Surabaya, shipped by Neediak.
08.	PT Kerta Timurindo	set up in 1991 as a side project of BIG's sandalwood and marble production units and deals in marble handicrafts and sandalwood statues, produced by 30 craftspersons in its factory near Comoro airport. Most of the craftspersons were recruited from Java. According to the Indonesian statistics, the two marble handicraft industries in Manatuto and Dili employed only 12 workers in 1990, producing 2,340 pieces of handicraft worth Rp 58,5 million with a total investment of Rp 9,3 million.
09.	Hotel Mahkota	largest, 92-rooms, 3-stories and most modern hotel in East Timor, located in the center of Dili, adjacent to the old SAPT-building.
10.	New Resende Inn	22-rooms hotel in Dili.
11.	Bioskop Seroja	the only cinema in Dili, located at the former Sporting stadium, where the "integration" farce took place on May 31, 1976.
12.	PT Watu Besi Raya	contracted most of the civil engineering projects in East Timor, incl. roads, bridges, and the unfinished harbor of Com in Lautem
13.	PT Gunung Kijang	contracted most of the minor civil engineering projects in East Timor
14.	PT Guntur Madutama Sejahtera	started sugar plantation and built sugar mill in Lautem; the product was supposed to be exported from the unfinished harbor of Com, which was financed by the Indonesian state.
15.	PT Konindo Timur	not clear what was/will be its line of production.

Source: Timor Timur dalam Angka 1990; Muller, 1991; *Tiara*, September 12, 1993; *Kompas*, September 5, 1993; *Jawa Pos*, September 9, 1993; *Suara Pembaruan*, May 17, 1993; interviews.

Table 5.
Production trend of sandalwood and sandalwood products in East Timor, from 1986/1987 till 1990/1991

Item	Total Production (in Kgs)				
	1986/1987	1987/1988	1988/1989	1989/1990	1990/91
Sandalwood	328,392	309,717	149,966	17,603	57,066
S. oil	0,300	--	7,500	8,000	2,700
S. powder	64,700	--	--	--	330,000

Source: Timor Timur Dalam Angka 1990, p. 165.

Table 6.
Export[22] trend of sandalwood products from East Timor from 1986 till 1990

Product	Total Amount (in Tons)				
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Sandalwood oil	2.3	5.6	6.3	1.8	3.8
Sandalwood powder	109.7	200.4	75.0	57.0	40.0

Source: Timor Timur dalam Angka 1990, p. 205.

with the total estimated marble available in East Timor (see Table 7), they might be able to maintain their level of production.

Therefore, if the monopolization of East Timor's strategic commodities continues along those lines, then practically every Maubere or Bibere would have to become an employee of Batara Indra Group, if he or she has not got a job with the gov-

22) In the Indonesian statistics this is documented as *perdagangan antar pulau*, or "inter-island trade," since the Indonesian state legally regards East Timor as an integral part of its territory.

ernment, the churches or other non-profit non-governmental organizations. So, besides losing their political independence, the Maubere were also slowly losing more and more of their economic independence.

Table 7.
The potentials of marble deposits in East Timor

District	POTENTIALS (thousands of M3)	
	Estimated	Hypothetical
Ermera:		
Atabae		1,500
Bobonaro		
Mt. Aben		
doDatoc		42,023,250
Mt. Cailaco		6,103,125
Balibo		66,062
		48,212,437
Ainaro:		
Desa Mulo		76,192
Mt.Qablaque		19,333
		95,525
Aileu:		
Hato-ermera	501	
Coulau	253	
Riafuso	2,066	
	2,920	
Manufahi:		
Mt. Caicassa in Same subdistrict		2,949,421
Manatuto:		
Hatada Hun	226,778	
Mt. Lilu	49,415	
Maholigaren	1,634	
Mt. Muoceun	79,190	
Mt. Curi	12,238	
	369,255	

Source: Penelitian dan Inventarisasi Bahan Galian Logam, Bahan Galian Bukan Logam dan Geohidrologi Propinsi Timor Timur, Yogyakarta: UPN "Veteran", 1992, pp. 7-8.

After losing many of their lives, their political as well as their economic independence, some of the Indonesian government programs are also drastically reduced the cultural diversity of the Maubere people. One of those programs was the house-building activities of the *Operasi Teritorial* (Opster) batalions in East Timor, which are everywhere building standar, nuclear family houses along the main roads, disregarding the various traditional architectural styles which has been discussed earlier. This violation of the traditional architectural patterns also violated the economic independence of the Maubere people, since living in standard rows of houses along the main roads took them farther and farther away from their swidden farms, their hunting grounds, and their customary forests. In addition, any trip faraway from the Opster-built houses required them to report to the local military post, before and after coming back from their subsistence trips.

Certainly, there have been some attempts by the Indonesian government to maintain the traditional architectural styles of the East Timorese. Those attempts, however, have been more of symbolic and touristic nature. The only architectural style that has been promoted so far was the Lospalos style, and that also only in certain places. Such as in Madame Soeharto's Miniature Beautiful Indonesia Park (*Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*), in the province's coat-of-arms, and in the village of Rasa in Lautem, where fourty-four families were on display to be admired by the passing-by tourists (see Muller, 1991: 269-271).

In that sense, the Indonesian occupation has not changed the Rasa village very much, since during the Portuguese time Rasa was already a show piece of excellent Lospalos craftsmanship. With the major difference being that during those times Rasa was not the only showpiece of Lautem architecture. When the Portuguese architect Ruy Cinatti made his famous study of treaditional East Timorese architecture, eight other villages shared that dignity, namely Vero, Tchailoro, Loro, Poros, Muapitine, Pehe-Fito, Ira-Ara, and Vailana (see Cinatti, de Almeida, and Mendes, 1987: 120-155).

Another government program which has effected the livelihood of many low-land farmers in the western border area of East Timor, was the sponsored migration of Balinese and Javanese farmers to the Bobonaro and Covalima districts. Those hard-working and land-hungry farmers from Java and Bali, where welcomed with land, that was already ready to be tilled. That land only needed some dikes and irrigation water, which the government was very willing to provide. Because, in contrast to the transmigration areas carved out of the tropical rainforests or savannah forests in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, paddy fields (*sawah*) had already been a well-established tradition in many parts of East Timor. What is unique of the East Timorese paddy fields is that the farmers rotate the irrigated rice with grass, so that besides harvesting their rice they can also "harvest" their Timorese cattle on those rice-fields during the dry season. While during the dry season, the cattle and the buffalos were used to

trample the mud in the rice fields, instead of the buffalo-drawn plows[23] in Java and Bali.

Unfortunately, the pacification war of 1975-1980 had killed most of the East Timorese cattle and buffalos (see Table 8), so that many rice-fields had been left idle. Thousands of hectares of such so-called "underutilized" rice fields were awarded by the Indonesian government to the Balinese and Javanese "transmigrants,"[24] without any compensation to the original land-owners, under the pretext of teaching the East Timorese better farming techniques. Hence, only in East Timor were the "transmigrants" officially called "pioneer farmers" (*petani teladan*), a title never given before to proper Indonesian transmigrants.

Table 8.
Animal Population in East Timor from 1976 to 1987

Type of animal	Total number of heads			
	1976	1980	1985	1987
Cattle	70,200	30,700	49,800	53,593
Buffalos	90,600	24,600	35,200	36,548
Horses	95,400	15,500	23,400	23,890
Goats	188,200	26,400	73,900	79,053
Sheep	27,700	11,200	27,500	28,309
Pigs	121,900	64,000	190,400	204,062
Poultry	724,500	218,800	417,900	453,204
Ducks	31,500	18,100	29,400	30,408

Source: Aditjondro, 1993b: 41.

While the previous discussions in this part has dealt more with the material changes that has occurred in East Timor, which has drastically changed the indigenous cultures, what about the non-material or "ideological" changes? Two radical changes need to be mentioned explicitly, namely the drastic growth of Catholicism, and the increasing popularity of Tetun.

As has been mentioned before, those who professed themselves to be Roman Catholics have increased tremendously since the Indonesian occupation, from only 27.8% in 1973 to 81.4% in 1989 (Neonbasu, 1992: 76). As mentioned before, too, six fac-

23) I have once read that plows were introduced to Western Indonesia from China, while in Eastern Indonesia, including in the Central Sulawesi highlands, which also has a old tradition of wet-rice farming, the preparation of the soil is also done by letting the buffalos trample the mud.

24) I am using the term "transmigrant" with apostrophes, because according to international law, they are actually immigrants who have moved from one state to another state, and not transmigrants who only moved from one island to another island within one state.

tors contributed to the drastic increase of Catholics in East Timor, which were (1) the religious policy of the Indonesian government which forces every citizen to adopt one of the five officially recognized religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hindu and Buddhism), whereas Catholicism seemed to be the most atractive choice, since the other recognized religions were mostly the religions of the newcomers and non-East Timorese; (2) the progressive stance which had been taken by the Catholic church in East Timor, especially under the eadership of Monsenhores Martinho Lopes and Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, to defend the universal human rights of the East Timorese people, including their right for self-determination; (3) participation in the numerous religious activities of the Catholic church was the only way to associate freely and publicly in large numbers, which the Indonesian authorities could not easily forbid, due to their Pancasila principles; (4) the iconography of the Catholic church, such as the crucifixes, Virgin Mary statues and *grottos*, and *via dolorosa* structures, substituted many of the indigenous forms of ancestor worship which became difficult to carry out in the teritory, since they might be labeled as Fretilin gatherings; (5) the influx of Catholics from the dominantly Catholic regions of East Nusa Tenggara, especially the Tetun-speaking Belunese in West Timor, who could easily travel by land to East Timor; and (6) the adoption of Tetun as the liturgical language to replace Portuguese, which has been abolished from public use in East Timor by the Indonesian government.

In spite of its position as an absolute and relative religious majority in the territory, the Catholic church has to face several problems at the same time. First, she has to be able to bring together both East Timorese and Indonesian Catholics residing in East Timor who supported integration with Indonesia as well as East Timorese who were still striving for an independent Timor Leste Republic. Second, with the increasing number of Indonesian Catholic lay- as well as religious persons residing temporarily or permanently in East Timor, different traditions of Catholicism had to confront each other. Third, for the first time in its history,[25] the East Timoresee Catholic church has to face a dynamic religious pluralism, with the number of non-Catholics continuously on the rise (see Table 9) due to the influx of outsiders as well as due to conversion of Catholics to other religions. Fourth, as the largest non-political force of the Maubere people, the Catholic church often had to confront the Indonesian authorities, especially Indonesian security forces.

While the first two problems -- the political and theological/liturgical diversity among the Catholics -- were still easy to cope with, the last two problems were much more of a headache to the Catholic church in East Timor. Many East Timorese Catholics, lay- as well as religious persons, saw those two problems as the two faces of the same coin. The rapid growth of non-Catholic religions -- some enjoyed a fantastic growth of 400 to 110% in 1992 (Neonbasu, 1992: 44) -- was seen as an indicator of the Indonesian domination over their homeland.

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25) During the Portuguese time, the Catholic church in East Timor enjoyed a near-monopoly for religious propagation in the territory, based on a 1940 Concordat between the Holy See and Portugal.

The emerging antipathy of Catholics against the non-Catholics, however, is an unhealthy attitude to be maintained. Because even in an independent East Timor, religious freedom --including the freedom to convert from one religion to another -- would be a universal human right which that independent East Timorese nation-state should respect. I do believe, however, that the reluctance against religious pluralism[26] in East Timor actually hid a deeper feeling, namely a feeling of insecurity among the indigenous East Timorese in the wake of the continuous influx of outsiders. In that sense, Catholicism was mainly an expression as their collective cultural identity.

Table 9:
Growth of Various Religious Groups in East Timor from 1974 to 1990

Religion	Total Number of Followers	
	1974	1990
Catholics	220,314	676,402
Protestants	2,550	20,660
Confucians	5,660	---
Moslems	135	27,334
Gentios (Pagans)	460,112	---
Hindu	---	3,961
Buddhism	---	841
Others	---	18,607
	668,771	747,557

Source: Dirdja, 1979: 22-23; Bappeda Tk. I, 1992: 128.

In that sense, too, many East Timorese also showed dissatisfaction against the influx of fellow Catholics from the neighboring Indonesian province of East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), remembering that those 'fellow Catholics' had been instrumental in

26) In spite of the official Portuguese policy to favor Catholicism in the territory, a certain degree of religious pluralism already existed in East Timor, prior to the Indonesian occupation. For instance, Duarte mentions in his study on Atauro, that from the 5,180 inhabitants of that island, about 1,000 people were Catholics, about 2,000 were Protestants, and the rest believed in natural or cosmic religions (1984: 15). The latest religious census during the Portuguese era also noted the existence of 2,550 people who professed to be Protestants. Meanwhile, according to Mar'i Alkatiri, a member of the Overseas Delegation of Fretilin (DEF = *Delegacao External do Fretilin*) who resides in Maputo, Mozambique, there were about 3,000 Muslims in Dili, 500 of them of Arabic (Hadramaut) origin, who regularly came to recite the Holy Qur'an in his father's house. Alkatiri's party also excepted religious pluralism, by appointing seven of its sixty members' Central Committee from the Muslim community in East Timor (Mar'i himself, who has left the country; three persons who have fallen in the guerilla war, namely Hamish Baswedan, Salim, and Ali; and three others who are still working in the underground movement). And as far as the Chinese community in East Timor were concerned, they were also free to profess their Confucian belief during the Portuguese time.

deliv ering them into the hands of the Indonesian generals in 1975.[27] Those fellow Catholics, especially the Tetun-speaking Belunese from West Timor, were arriving daily by buses from Atambua,[28] and were also buying the land of the East Timorese in the border districts of Bobonaro and Covalima, just like what the successful Javanese and Balinese immigrants. Hence, in the case of a referendum, those Tetun-speaking West Timorese could tilt the balance in favor of continuing the forced integration with Indonesia, so some of my East Timorese sources feared.

In the mean time, immigrants from South Sulawesi and other parts of Indonesia were also arriving every week in Dili in the three new Indonesian passenger ships, KM Kelimutu, KM Tatamailau, and KM Dobonsoro.[29] They had certainly become a very decisive economic force in East Timor, with Buginese shops already lining along the main road from Dili to Same across the Mambai highlands, selling all kinds of daily needs, from food, textiles, to gasoline.

Nevertheless, the increasing religious plurality has already caused tensions between the various groups, which were partially instigated by the local Indonesian authorities. For instance, in Hatu Builico, Hatu Udo, and Ainaro, local policemen forced some children to convert to Protestantism. If they refused, they would be accused of being *kepala dua* (lit.: "double headed," a code for Fretilin symphatizers). In Suai, a member of the *Hansip*, or paramilitary force, was intimidated against returning from Islam to his original religion, Catholicism, by accusing him of being a Fretilin member. He had to "rehabilitate" his name by bribing the local authorities with gold.

While Catholics were intimidated by non-Catholics, attacks on non-Catholics have also taken place. On one night, some clandestine high-school student activists removed the loudspeaker from the large mosque, built by Indonesia, in Kampung Alor, Dili, and buried into the ground near the mosque. In Lospalos, Lautem, two *Menwa* or student regiment members from Java, who had declared publicly that they wanted to spread the Islamic religion all over the territory, were shot dead together with two Muslim Indonesian soldiers on March 17, 1993, near a military post outside the town of Lospalos (Aditjondro, 1993a: 6).

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27) Among the most outstanding NTT Catholics who had been very instrumental in the Indonesian take-over of East Timor were the late Louis Taolin, a son of the last king of Insana in Kefamenanu, West Timor, who mainly dealt with the East Timorese refugees and "partisans" from West Timor; Frans Seda, a well-known Indonesian diplomat who hails from Flores, who together with Ben Mang Reng Say, another Indonesian diplomat and former ambassador to Portugal, dealt mainly with the Portuguese government officials and generals to lobby them to favor the Indonesian take-over.

28) It is interesting to note that while official Indonesian statistics have recorded the number of travelers coming in and out of East Timor by sea and air, there were no data available about the number of bus passengers which entered the territory from West Timor.

29) Indonesian statistics show that after the opening up of the territory in 1988, the net-inflow of people who came by sea rised drastically from a net outflow of 248 persons in 1987 to a net inflow of 1,995 persons in 1989. Most of the new arrivals came from South Sulawesi.

This brings us to the fourth problem, namely the continuous confrontation between the Catholic church and the Indonesian state, an area where the theology -- and endurance -- of the church leaders were constantly tested. Interestingly enough, in this field a symbolic battle between the church and Indonesian state leaders have been waged during the last decade.

To claim its stake over the entire territory, the church leaders have boosted the construction of as many physical Catholic symbols -- crucifixes, Virgin Mary statues and *grottos*, and *via dolorosas* -- on as many hills and mountains as possible. For instance, an Italian marble statue of Jesus Christ was erected on the top of the Matebian in a religious procession led by the acting Bishop of Dili, Mgr. Belo, during the annual Virgin Mary celebration on October 13, 1993.

On the other hand, the Indonesian security forces have confronted the symbolic challenge of the church through overt and covert means. The overt means included the construction of *integrasi* monuments in as many towns and villages as possible. One of such monuments was under construction in the capital of Ainaro district in July 1993. Meanwhile, the covert means involved the attack on the Motael church, the oldest church in Dili, as well as the destruction of Virgin Mary statues in Dili and Bobonaro (see Table 10). In many of the latter incidents (destruction of Virgin Mary statues), the security apparatus produced interrogation reports which stated that those vandalistic and sacrilegeous acts were done by parish activists carrying out the orders of their parish priests. Stories which no sane people believed in East Timor, including the provincial prosecutor, a Muslim who had been educated at Catholic schools.

While the humiliation of the "physical" religious symbols were only occurring incidentally, one of the most persistent and widely supported issues of conflict between the Catholic church and the Indonesian state in East Timor (see Table 11) was family planning. Based on the *Humanae Vitae* encyclical, the acting Bishop strongly opposed the Indonesian government's "family planning"[30] program, prohibiting all artificial contraceptives while only allowing natural methods. In this field, Mgr. Belo received unanimous support even from pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders, including former governor Mario Carrascalao who criticized the application of injectable contraceptives on secondary school girls (see de Magalhaes, 1990: 58). And with the latest trend in Indonesia's family planning program in East Timor, where injectables -- which can prevent pregnancy for up to six months -- and implants -- which can prevent pregnancy for years -- (see Table 12) were still very widely applied, this area of conflict between the Indonesian state and the East Timorese Catholic church may still continue in the coming years.

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[30]) I believe that the term "family planning" program is actually incorrect, and should better be renamed, "female fertility control" program, since that it was actually dominates this program. Look at how many new techniques to control women's fertility are constantly developed and introduced, compared to techniques to control men's fertility.

Table 10:
Destruction and/or humiliation of Catholic religious symbols in East Timor since 1975

Date	Place	Description of incidents
7 - 13 Dec. 1975	Nossa Senhora de Fatima seminary in Dare, Dili	70% of the seminary building was destroyed by heavy sea & land bombing during the invasion
Unrecorded	Maliana church in Bobonaro	A wall hit by canon bullet during the invasion
Unrecorded	Virgin Mary statue at Lecidere, Dili, in front of the Bishop's residence	Coiling a dead snake around the neck of the statue
January '87	Virgin Mary *grotto* in Comoro, Dili	Destruction of the Virgin Mary statue
27 Feb. '87	Virgin Mary *grotto* in Lahane, Dili	Destruction of the Virgin Mary statue
15 Sept. '91	Virgin Mary *grotto* in Malilait, Bobonaro	Destruction of the Virgin Mary statue
28 Oct. '91	Motael church, Dili	Throwing of stones and shooting at the church
12 Nov. 1991	Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili	Chapel and graves brazen by gun shots aimed at the mourners. Since the massacre, the cemetery has been heavily guarded by plain-clothed military men, prohibiting the families of the deceased to pray at the graves.

Source: Cardoso Gomes, 1992: 8; *Jakarta-Jakarta*, 13-19 November 1993: 79-80; interviews & field observations.

Table 11:
Several areas/issues of conflict between the Diocese of Dili and the Indonesian state, apart from the humiliation and/or destruction of religious objects

Area/Issue	Time
(I)	(II)
Education:	
Fr. Jose Antonio da Costa (now Vic.Gen. of the Diocese), as the first head of the Indonesian Education Service in East Timor, suggested to Jakarta to continue the reforms proposed by the East Timor Educational Reform Committee (CRET = *Comissao de Reforma Ensino de Timor*), which had been formed by the Portuguese and in which Fr. da Costa had been actively involved. Those proposals included a two-years vocational training program for elementary school graduates who could not continue their studies.This suggestion was turned down, and the East Timorese had to follow the centralized curriculum of the Indonesian Department of Education.	1976
After long opposed by the Diocese, the only Portuguese-language high-school, *Externato*, which still combined its Portuguese curriculum with some sections of the compulsory Indonesian curriculum, was closed, after the Indonesian security apparatus suspected many students of this school to be involved in the November 12, 1991 demonstration.	March '92
Famine Relief:	
In spite of her extensive network and good relationship with the East Timorese people, the Catholic church was prohibited from distributing famine relief received through government channels, since the local Indonesian army commander found that only the Indonesian government had the monopoly over the distribution of that relief. Hence, many parish priests and Catholic school principals had to purchase food and medicine for their parishioners and students in kiosks where a large portion of the relief donations were sold.	1977-1978
Violation of universal human rights:	
In a pastoral letter, Mgr. Belo strongly criticized the Indonesian security apparatus for violating the civil and political rights of East Timorese involved in a messianistic movement, *Yayasan Santo Antonius*.	5 Dec.1988
In two letters to the UN Secretary General, Mgr. Belo appealed for respect the right of the East Timorese people for self-determination through a UN-supervised referendum.	6 Feb. 1989 & August 1989
In response to the attack on the Motael church on 28 October 1991, which caused the death of Sebastiao Gomes, and consequently the	Nov. 1991

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(I)	(II)
Santa Cruz massacre on November 12, Mgr. Belo issued three pastoral letters (dated November 2, 14, and 22), which strongly criticized the very biased media coverage of the Indonesian state-controlled media. To emphasize his protest, Mgr. Belo also refused to attend the Indonesian bishops' annual conference, where he has an observer's status.	
Church's Land: With the application of Indonesian agrarian law, the status of the church's land was changed from private property to only use rights, which at any time could be withdrawn by the Indonesian state. This radical change, compared with the church's land privileges under the Portuguese law, also raised strong objections from East Timorese lay leaders, incl. an East Timorese parliamentarian, Salvador Ximenes J. Soares, and former governor Mario Carrascalao, who raised the church's concerns to an Indonesian parliamentary mission to East Timor in July 1991.	1991
Family Planning: In a pastoral letter, Mgr. Belo criticized the Indonesian government's family planning program, which had already been zealously introduced in East Timor since 1980. He categorically labeled all unnatural contraceptive methods as being "illicit and illegal" from the canonical law's point of view. This opposition against the Indonesian governments FP program has been strongly endorsed by the lay leaders of the diocese, incl. former governor Mario Carrascalao and former head of the provincial Population & Environment Bureau, Tito Baptista.	May 1986 until today
Manipulation of cultural and religious ceremonies: A series of "blood oath" ceremonies were engineered by the security apparatus in Soibada (Manatuto), Baucau, Aileu,and Ainaro, to show to the outside world that Fretilin supporters had already dropped their quest for independence and had became good Indonesian citizens as well as "good Catholics." In Soibada, 47 persons had to join the fabricated ritual on December 11. A week later, 397 persons had to join a similar ritual in the capital of Ainaro district. These people were rounded up from the subdistrict of Ainaro (± 200 persons), Maubisse (± 126 persons), Hatu Builico (± 60 persons), and the rest were Hatu Udu. All those persons -- or their parents -- were suspected of being clandestine resistence activists. Small samples of their blood were taken, and mix-	Dec. 1992

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(I)	(II)
ed with the blood of 8 cocks and 6 bottles of whiskey. They had to drink that mixture, and pledge loyalty to the Indonesian flag, and finally have a collective meal with the local parish priest in the church. The priest objected to this ritual, which was against the East Timorese tradition, where both the conflicting parties had to drink each other's blood. It was also against the Catholic tradition, since with Christ's death on the cross, no more blood had to be shed by all human beings. So, the priest left the town, and only an assistant had to "bless" the strange ritual. The young man resisted by saying the Holy Father prayer by opening and closing the prayer without making the Catholic cross. However, in the Indonesian news media, the entire ritual was presented as if they were genuine. After Mgr. Belo received reports from the parish priests in all those places about their forced participation in those strange rituals, he filed a strong protest against the local Indonesian military commander, Theo Syafei. Hence, further "blood oaths" were stopped. Nevertheless, in Suai, another strange ritual had still been carried out. There an Indonesian flag was soaked in ordinary water, and that water was forced to be drunk by those who were suspected of being clandestine activists.	

Sources: *Editor*, Nov. 30, 1991: 20; *Hidup*, June 1, 1986: 35-36, April 2, 1989: 32-33, 45, Jan. 8, 1989: 21, June 18, 1989: 24-26, Dec. 15, 1991: 20-22; *Jakarta Post*, March 30, 1992; *Jawa Pos*, Dec. 19, 1992; *Kompas*, Dec. 14, 1992; *Panji Masyarakat*, June 1-10, 1989: 16, Sept. 11-20, 1989: 19; *Suara Pembaruan*, August 1, 1991, Dec. 22, 1992; *Suara Merdeka*, Dec. 26-27, 1992; *Tempo*, May 27, 1989: 14; Dirdja, 1979: 27; interviews.

Table 11.
New Acceptors and the Contraceptive Techniques applied at "Family Planning" Clinics in East Timor in 1990/1991

Rank	Number of new acceptors (persons)	Technique Used	Percentage
01.	5,105	Injectables	65.52
02.	1,127	Pills	14.46
03.	698	IUD	8.95
04.	637	Implant	8.17
05.	147	Condoms	1.88
06.	77	MOW/P	0.98
Total of 7,791 new acceptors			

Source: Timor Timur dalam Angka 1990, p. 108.

As in the case of the resistance against religious pluralism, I believe that what was at issue here was not simply a blind fidelity to a Papal encyclical. Nor was it mainly a matter of protecting the right of the women of East Timor to make their own reproductive choices. I believe that what was at stake was protecting a "patriotic duty" of the East Timorese women to bear as many babies as possible, to make up for the tremendous losses of lives during the Indonesian occupation, in order that the East Timorese people could still survive as a people.

In other words, what was at stake was the survival of the East Timorese in their own homeland, especially in response to the challenge of the increasing influx of Indonesian immi grants. The massacre at Santa Cruz, where 271 young people died, 250 were missing, and 382 were wounded (Peace is Possible, 1992), made this question of survival even more urgent.

What has not been discussed in this matter, however, was how to share the burden of child-bearing and child-rearing more equally among the different genders. Because in the traditional East Timorese society, child-bearing and child-rearing activities concerned the women more than the men, in addition to food-preparation and cloth-weaving (see Fundacao Oriental, 1989). So, while agreeing that opposing a genocidal policy is certainly a political virtue, one still has to think about who has to bear the personal consequences of such a political strategy.

Finally, let me briefly touch upon the popularization of the Tetun language. In the post-Portuguese time, it was initiated by the radical independence movement, Fretilin in 1974, and continued in the bushes until the 1976-1979 aerial bombing put an end on the widespread guerilla movement. Then, in the early 1980s, Tetun received a boost due to its adoption as the main liturgical language. And eventually, in 1990, to win the hearts and souls of the East Timorese, even the Indonesian government adopted a policy to teach Tetun officially in all the elementary schools in East Timor (Suprihanto, 1992: 11). Thereby, Tetun may become not only a real *lingua franca*, but an official second language after Bahasa Indonesia in East Timor, just like the function of Javanese an unofficial first language among the Javanese-speaking Indonesians. But what will then happen with the linguistic diversity of East Timor, which we have discussed before? Or is the popularization of Tetun, which is also the language of a part of the West Timorese people? A cultural strategy to make the integration of East Timor into Indonesia less painful, so that we can say that this linguistic strategy functions as a kind of "shock absorber"?

In the mean time, while many vernacular languages were on the brink of extinction, due to the popularization of Tetun, the Portuguese language was rising from the grave in which the Indonesian authorities had intended to bury it. Portuguese, which in former times was the language of oppression, has been transformed into the language of resistance. In spite of its abolition from the public and private schools, Portuguese is currently widely used in the clandestine communication networks between the resistance leaders and militants in East Timor and abroad.

This all boils down to one basic question, with which I want to conclude these "sketches of East Timorese cultures": what may become the result of all those cultural changes? Hopefully, not a tremendous reduction of all the cultural diversity of the East Timorese people, with which they have been blessed by the Almighty, through nature, through history, and through their own ingenuity and endurance ——

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In the shadow of
Mount Merbabu,
Friday,
14 January 1994

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